Moderating Political Extremism : Single vs Dual Ballot Elections ∗

  title={Moderating Political Extremism : Single vs Dual Ballot Elections ∗},
  author={Massimo Bordignon and Guido Tabellini},
We compare single ballot vs dual ballot elections under plurality rule, assuming sincere voting and allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under the dual ballot, the number of parties is larger but the influence of extremists voters on equilibrium policy is smaller, because their bargaining power is reduced compared to a single ballot election. The predictions on the number of parties are consistent with data on municipal elections in Italy, where cities with more (less) than 15,000… CONTINUE READING

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