• DOI:10.1016/0014-2921(95)00111-5
Corpus ID: 14506793

Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fulfilling Features

@inproceedings{Obstfeld1995ModelsOC,
  title={Models of Currency Crises with Self-Fulfilling Features},
  author={M. Obstfeld},
  year={1995}
}

M. Obstfeld

Published 1995

Economics

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The discomfort a government suffers from speculation against its currency determines the strategic incentives of speculators and the scope for multiple currency-market equilibria. After describing an illustrative model in which high unemployment may cause an exchange- rate crisis with self-fulfilling features, the paper reviews some other self-reinforcing mechanisms. Recent econometric evidence seems to support the practical importance of these mechanisms.