Modeling and Computing Two-Settlement Oligopolistic Equilibrium in a Congested Electricity Network

  title={Modeling and Computing Two-Settlement Oligopolistic Equilibrium in a Congested Electricity Network},
  author={Jian Yao and I. Adler and S. Oren},
  journal={Oper. Res.},
A model of two-settlement electricity markets is introduced, which accounts for flow congestion, demand uncertainty, system contingencies, and market power. We formulate the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for this model as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC), in which each firm solves a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). The model assumes linear demand functions, quadratic generation cost functions, and a lossless DC network, resulting in… Expand
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