Corpus ID: 8891918

Modeling Internet Security Investments: The Case of Dealing with Information Uncertainty

  title={Modeling Internet Security Investments: The Case of Dealing with Information Uncertainty},
  author={Ranjan Pal and Pan Hui},
Modern distributed communication networks like the Internet and censorship-resistant networks (also a part of the Internet) are characterized by nodes (users) interconnected with one another via communication links. In this regard, the security of individual nodes depend not only on their own efforts, but also on the efforts and underlying connectivity structure of neighboring network nodes. By the term 'effort', we imply the amount of investments made by a user in security mechanisms like… Expand


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