• Corpus ID: 14172008

Modeling Cyber-Insurance: Towards a Unifying Framework

  title={Modeling Cyber-Insurance: Towards a Unifying Framework},
  author={Rainer B{\"o}hme and Galina Schwartz},
  booktitle={Workshop on the Economics of Information Security},
We propose a comprehensive formal framework to classify all market models of cyber-insurance we are aware of. The framework features a common terminology and deals with the specific properties of cyber-risk in a unified way: interdependent security, correlated risk, and information asymmetries. A survey of existing models, tabulated according to our framework, reveals a discrepancy between informal arguments in favor of cyber-insurance as a tool to align incentives for better network security… 

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