Modeling Adversaries in a Logic for Security Protocol Analysis

@article{Halpern2006ModelingAI,
  title={Modeling Adversaries in a Logic for Security Protocol Analysis},
  author={Joseph Y. Halpern and Riccardo Pucella},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2006},
  volume={abs/cs/0607146}
}
Logics for security protocol analysis require the formalization of an adversary model that specifies the capabilities of adversaries. A common model is the Dolev-Yao model, which considers only adversaries that can compose and replay messages, and decipher them with known keys. The Dolev-Yao model is a useful abstraction, but it suffers from some drawbacks: it cannot handle the adversary knowing protocol-specific information, and it cannot handle probabilistic notions, such as the adversary… Expand
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