Mitigating Monopoly or Preventing Discrimination: Comparing Antitrust to Regulatory Goals in the Interstate Commerce Act

@article{Brennan2013MitigatingMO,
  title={Mitigating Monopoly or Preventing Discrimination: Comparing Antitrust to Regulatory Goals in the Interstate Commerce Act},
  author={Timothy J. Brennan},
  journal={Review of Industrial Organization},
  year={2013},
  volume={43},
  pages={103-119}
}
  • T. Brennan
  • Published 2013
  • Economics
  • Review of Industrial Organization
The Interstate Commerce Act and Sherman Antitrust Act were passed within 3 years of each other. Although regulation and antitrust both address market power, the ICA and Sherman Act had different objectives. After a minimal reference to just and reasonable prices, the ICA focused on preventing price discrimination in rail. No posited Sherman Act goal—inequality, consumer welfare, efficiency—is in the ICA. Priority of discrimination in the ICA, however, is predictable. Shippers would care less… Expand
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