Misrepresentation of Utilities in Bargaining: Pure Exchange and Public Good Economies

  title={Misrepresentation of Utilities in Bargaining: Pure Exchange and Public Good Economies},
  author={{\"O}zg{\"u}r Kibris},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
In order to analyze bargaining in pure exchange and public good economies when the agents are not informed about their opponents’ payoffs, we embed each bargaining problem into a noncooperative game of misrepresentation. In pure exchange (public good) economies with an arbitrary number of agents whose true utilities satisfy a mild assumption, the set of allocations obtained at the linear-strategies Nash equilibria of this game is equal to the set of constrained Walrasian (Lindahl) allocations… CONTINUE READING

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