Mirror neurons, embodied simulation and a second-person approach to mindreading

  title={Mirror neurons, embodied simulation and a second-person approach to mindreading},
  author={Vittorio Gallese},
  • V. Gallese
  • Published 1 November 2013
  • Biology, Psychology
  • Cortex
Embodiment: A New Key to the Unconscious?
The dialogue between psychoanalysis and the so-called embodied cognitive science has led to alternative understandings of the unconscious functioning of the mind. Unconscious learning,
Neural bases of action abstraction
Simulation and Understanding Other Minds
There is much disagreement about how extensive a role theoretical mindreading, behavior-reading, and simulation each have and need to have in our knowing and understanding other minds, and how each
Mental Rotation in False Belief Understanding
Previous findings on EET in visuospatial perspective taking are extended and suggest that false belief reasoning, which is a kind of psychological perspective taking, can also involve embodied rotation, consistent with the embodied cognition view.
Cross-species mind-reading
We can never be sure anyone else is sentient. But we can be sure enough in the case of other people, nonhuman primates, mammals, birds, fish, lower vertebrates and invertebrates as to make scepticism
Attention to Metaphor
  • V. Cuccio
  • Psychology
    Metaphor in Language, Cognition, and Communication
  • 2018
The last decades of the twentieth century have witnessed a fundamental scientific discovery: the identification of mirror neurons and, consequently, the development of the Embodied Simulation theory.
Mentalizing homeostasis: The social origins of interoceptive inference
Is the self already relational in its very bodily foundations? The question of whether our mental life is initially and primarily shaped by embodied dimensions of the individual or by interpersonal
Binding Action and Emotion in First-Episode Schizophrenia
The results show that emotional cues allow SCZ patients to partially recover mirror neuron-driven embodied simulation (mnES), however, their understanding of the emotional components of the actions of others will likely remain deficient.


Before and below ‘theory of mind’: embodied simulation and the neural correlates of social cognition
  • V. Gallese
  • Psychology
    Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
  • 2007
Embodied simulation and the mirror neuron system underpinning it provide the means to share communicative intentions, meaning and reference, thus granting the parity requirements of social communication.
Motor cognition and its role in the phylogeny and ontogeny of action understanding.
The functional properties of the mirror neuron system and its direct matching mechanism indicate that action understanding may be primarily based on the motor cognition that underpins one's own capacity to act, providing a biologically plausible and theoretically unitary account for the phylogeny and ontogeny of action understanding and also its impairment, as in the case of autistic spectrum disorder.
Social cognition and the brain: a meta-analysis.
The results suggest that inferring temporary states such as goals, intentions, and desires of other people-even when they are false and unjust from the authors' own perspective--strongly engages the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in social cognition.
Evidence of Mirror Neurons in Human Inferior Frontal Gyrus
To identify mirror neurons in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) of humans, a repetition suppression paradigm was used while measuring neural activity with functional magnetic resonance imaging and showed that in the IFG, responses were suppressed both when an executed action was followed by the same rather than a different observed action.
Social cognition and the brain: A meta‐analysis
The results suggest that inferring temporary states such as goals, intentions, and desires of other people—even when they are false and unjust from the authors' own perspective—strongly engages the temporo‐parietal junction (TPJ) and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC).
Mechanisms of social cognition.
It is suggested that meta-cognitive processes can also exert control over automatic behavior, for instance, when short-term gains oppose long-term aims or when selfish and prosocial interests collide and underlie the ability to explicitly share experiences with other agents.
The impact of extensive medial frontal lobe damage on 'Theory of Mind' and cognition.
G.T. had a dysexecutive syndrome characterized by impairments in planning and memory, as well as a tendency to confabulate, but did not have any significant impairment on tasks probing her ability to construct a 'Theory of Mind', demonstrating that the extensive medial frontal regions destroyed by her stroke are not necessary for this function.