Minority Party Strategy in the House of Representatives: Cross-Pressuring and the Motion to Recommit

Abstract

The minority party in the House of Representatives possesses few procedural advantages. As a result, it is typically dominated by the majority party. I argue that the minority controls the use of one procedure in the House, the motion to recommit, and that it uses this control to strategically cross-pressure members of the majority party. Ultimately, this cross-pressuring places the minority in a win-win situation where they either receive a policy victory or better election results. The results of this project overwhelming support the theory of cross-pressuring and indicate that the minority is able to design, implement, and reap the benefits of its own strategy in the House. INDEX WORDS: Congress, House of Representatives, Minority party, Motion to recommit, Legislative process, Legislative strategy MINORITY PARTY STRATEGY IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: CROSSPRESSURING AND THE MOTION TO RECOMMIT

Extracted Key Phrases

17 Figures and Tables

Cite this paper

@inproceedings{Webb2015MinorityPS, title={Minority Party Strategy in the House of Representatives: Cross-Pressuring and the Motion to Recommit}, author={Brian Webb and Jeffrey Victor Lazarus and Amy McKay and Amy Steigerwalt}, year={2015} }