Corpus ID: 67790455

Minimal Envy and Popular Matchings

  title={Minimal Envy and Popular Matchings},
  author={Aleksei Y. Kondratev and Alexander S. Nesterov},
  • Aleksei Y. Kondratev, Alexander S. Nesterov
  • Published 2019
  • Computer Science
  • ArXiv
  • We study ex-post fairness in the object allocation problem where objects are valuable and commonly owned. A matching is fair from individual perspective if it has only inevitable envy towards agents who received most preferred objects -- minimal envy matching. A matching is fair from social perspective if it is supported by majority against any other matching -- popular matching. Surprisingly, the two perspectives give the same outcome: when a popular matching exists it is equivalent to a… CONTINUE READING
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