Corpus ID: 67790455

Minimal Envy and Popular Matchings

@article{Kondratev2019MinimalEA,
  title={Minimal Envy and Popular Matchings},
  author={Aleksei Y. Kondratev and Alexander S. Nesterov},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2019},
  volume={abs/1902.08003}
}

Aleksei Y. Kondratev, Alexander S. Nesterov

Published 2019

Computer Science

ArXiv

We study ex-post fairness in the object allocation problem where objects are valuable and commonly owned. A matching is fair from individual perspective if it has only inevitable envy towards agents who received most preferred objects -- minimal envy matching. A matching is fair from social perspective if it is supported by majority against any other matching -- popular matching. Surprisingly, the two perspectives give the same outcome: when a popular matching exists it is equivalent to a… CONTINUE READING

View PDF on arXiv

Save to Library

Create Alert

Cite

Launch Research Feed