Corpus ID: 109304561

Mines and Underwater IEDs in U.S Ports and Waterways: Context, Threats, Challenges, and Solutions

  title={Mines and Underwater IEDs in U.S Ports and Waterways: Context, Threats, Challenges, and Solutions},
  author={S. Truver},
Abstract : A broad spectrum of nontraditional and asymmetric threats challenges U.S. maritime homeland security. Under the cloak of legal activity, groups that would do the United States harm can enter the U.S. homeland anywhere along more than 95,000 miles of coastlines and through some 360 ports from Maine to Guam. The threats of the Cold War are gone, and the United States finds itself operating in an environment where piracy, illegal migration, drug smuggling, terrorism, arms proliferation… Expand
Unmanned Undersea Vehicles: An Asymmetric Tool for Sea Denial
Abstract : One of the most salient trends in military technology is the growing prominence of unmanned vehicles. Much has been written about Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs), and a fair amount aboutExpand
Sea Devils, Submersibles, and Underwater IEDs: Asymmetric Undersea Threats to Assured Access in an Operational Environment
Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searchingExpand
Computer-aided detection of rapid, overt, airborne, reconnaissance data with the capability of removing oceanic noises
Abstract : There have been three times more attacks to naval ships using sea mines than all other forms combined. Sea mines have always been viewed upon as underhanded and unchivalrous, yet theyExpand
Managing new technology investment for underwater security of ports
This study focuses on the economic implications of positive externalities in new technology investment for underwater security of ports and waterways. The evidence on the magnitude of positiveExpand
Simulation Analysis of a System to Defeat Maritime Improvised Explosive Devices (MIED) in a US Port
Although the risk of an attack in a US port could be considered a low-probability event, the importance ports and waterways play in domestic and global commerce demands timely and effectiveExpand
Mine Safety Detection System (MSDS)
Abstract : The search, detection, identification and assessment components of the U.S. Navy's organic modular in-stride Mine Countermeasure (MCM) Concept of Operations (CONOPS) have been evaluatedExpand
The U.S. Navy's task forces: 1–199
ABSTRACT Grouping warships for combat has evolved greatly over the centuries. In the early 1940s, the United States Navy began to group its warships for combat in much more flexible task forces thanExpand
Automatic change detection for the monitoring of cluttered underwater areas
An approach based on Change Detection which is capable of coping with the expected high number of potential threats is proposed for the surveillance of cluttered areas and is tested on a real scenario using synthetic aperture sonar data. Expand
Mine Burial Expert System for Change of MIW Doctrine
Abstract : Mine impact burial models such as IMPACT25, IMPACT28, and IMPACT35 have been used in the MIW community in an attempt to calculate the percentage of impact burial for sea mines. UntilExpand
Bedrohungen und Schutz der kritischen Infrastruktur an Häfen, Flughäfen und Bahnhöfen
ZusammenfassungSeehäfen, Flughäfen und Bahnhöfe stellen besonders kritische Bereiche der Infrastruktur dar, die vielfach verwundbar sind. Sie sind darüber hinaus von zentraler ökonomischer undExpand


The Politics of Maritime Power : A Survey
The Components of Maritime Power Maritime Strategy Technology and Navies Naval Diplomacy Navies and Warfighting Navies and the Maintenance of Good Order in Peacetime The Maritime Governance SystemExpand
Bushnell rigged a double line of “torpedoes
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