Minds, machines and Searle

  title={Minds, machines and Searle},
  author={Stevan Harnad},
  journal={J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell.},
  • S. Harnad
  • Published 1989
  • Philosophy
  • J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell.
Searle's celebrated Chinese Room Argument has shaken the foundations of Artificial Intelligence. Many refutations have been attempted, but none seem convincing. This paper is an attempt to sort out explicitly the assumptions and the logical, methodological and empirical points of disagreement. Searle is shown to have underestimated some features of computer modeling, but the heart of the issue turns out to be an empirical question about the scope and limits of the purely symbolic (computational… 

Intentionality and computationalism: minds, machines, Searle and Harnad

  • M. Dyer
  • Philosophy
    J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell.
  • 1990
This paper critically examines both Searle' s and Hamad' s arguments and concludes that the foundations of AT remain unchanged by these arguments, that the Turing Test remains adequate as a test of intentionality, and that the philosophical position of computationalism remains perfectly reasonable as a working hypothesis for the task of describing and embodying intentionality in brains and machines.

Searle's AI program

  • K. Korb
  • Philosophy
    J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell.
  • 1991
This paper presents a variety of arguments, theoretical and intuitive, to show that Searle is conflating mentality and semantics, and addresses how to generate the semantics that intelligence requires.

The logic of Searle’s Chinese room argument

Treating the CRA as a prototypical example of a ‘destructive’ thought experiment, this paper attempts to set it in a logical framework (due to Sorensen), which allows us to systematise and classify the various objections.

The Key to the Chinese Room

John Searle’s famous thought experiment concerning the Chinese Room (CR) is cast rhetorically in terms that are standard for the target it seeks to defeat, the strong computational claims made about

Computation and Intentionality: A Recipe for Epistemic Impasse

  • I. Shani
  • Philosophy
    Minds and Machines
  • 2005
It is argued that the existence of symbol-world correspondence is not aproperty that the cognitive system itself can appreciate, from its own perspective, by interacting with the symbol and therefore, not a property that can constitute intrinsic content.

Searle's Chinese Room and its Aftermath

This paper attempts a systematic survey of some of the issues raised by Searle and his critics, while including new arguments on the application of the Chinese Room Argument to causal reductionism

Fodor, functions, physics, and fantasyland: is AI a Mickey Mouse discipline?

It is argued that, given the recalcitrance of certain deep conceptual problems in psychology, and disagreements concerning psychology's basic vocabulary, it is unlikely that AI will prove to be very psychologically enlightening until some consensus on ontological issues in psychology is achieved.

Grounding Symbolic Capacity in Robotic Capacity

Depite considerations in favor of symbol grounding, neither pure connectionism nor pure nonsymbolic robotics can be counted out yet, in the path to robotic Turing Test. So far only computationalism

Social Cognition, the Chinese Room, and the Robot Replies

In philosophy of mind and related disciplines, the standard conceptions of mind have been formulated in terms of a problem space that excludes certain solutions to problems defined in that space.

Minds, Machines and Turing

Turing's celebrated 1950 paper proposes a very general methodological criterion for modelling mental function: total functionalequivalence and indistinguishability, which gives rise to hierarchy of Turing Tests, a“reverse-engineering” hierarchy of (decreasing) empirical underdetermination of the theory by the data.



Minds, Machines and Gödel

Gödei's Theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained as machines. So also has it seemed to many other people: almost every mathematical logician I

I. It ain't the meat, it's the motion

John R. Searle has recently observed that something might instantiate a Chinese‐‘understanding’ computer program without having any understanding of Chinese. He thinks that this implies that

Minds, brains, and programs

  • J. Searle
  • Philosophy
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • 1980
Only a machine could think, and only very special kinds of machines, namely brains and machines with internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains, and no program by itself is sufficient for thinking.

Gödel's Theorem and the Mind1

  • P. Slezak
  • Philosophy
    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 1982
J. R. Lucas has articulated and defended the view that Godel's theorems imply the falsity of mechanism as a theory of the mind. In this paper I offer a novel analysis of Lucas's argument which shows


principles are tested against the facts in comparative linguistics. (Ref. 9, Sections 5 , 6, & 7.) Above, we described the controversy between rationalism and empiricism over the uniqueness of human

Mind, language, and reality

Introduction 1. Language and philosophy 2. The analytic and synthetic 3. Do true assertions correspond to reality? 4. Some issues in the theory of grammar 5. The 'innateness hypothesis' and

On the proper treatment of connectionism

Abstract A set of hypotheses is formulated for a connectionist approach to cognitive modeling. These hypotheses are shown to be incompatible with the hypotheses underlying traditional cognitive

Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructures of Cognition

In decades to come, perhaps 1986 will be remembered by academics as the year of publication of the pair of volumes reviewed here: they constitute the first large-scale public statement of an intellectual paradigm fully as revolutionary as the generative paradigm ever was.

On the nature of programs, simulations, and organisms

  • R. Harvey
  • Philosophy
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • 1985
of the original article: This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of

Précis of The Intentional Stance

  • D. Dennett
  • Philosophy, Psychology
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • 1988
Abstract The intentional stance is the strategy of prediction and explanation that attributes beliefs, desires, and other “intentional” states to systems – living and nonliving – and predicts future