Minds, brains, and programs

@article{Searle1980MindsBA,
  title={Minds, brains, and programs},
  author={John R. Searle},
  journal={Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  year={1980},
  volume={3},
  pages={417 - 424}
}
  • J. Searle
  • Published 1 September 1980
  • Philosophy
  • Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Abstract This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain. I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes and brains. It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality. (2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality. The main argument of… 
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  • Philosophy
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • 1985
of the original article: This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of
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of the original article: This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of
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  • V. Goel
  • Psychology, Biology
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • 1993
TLDR
The essential point is that intrinsic intentionality has aspectual shape: The authors' mental representations represent the world under specific aspects, and these aspectual features are essential to a mental state's being the state that it is.
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  • J. Searle
  • Psychology, Biology
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • 1990
TLDR
The essential point is that intrinsic intentionality has aspectual shape: The authors' mental representations represent the world under specific aspects, and these aspectual features are essential to a mental state's being the state that it is.
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  • Psychology
    Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofiya, sotsiologiya, politologiya
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The paper is devoted to Jerry Fodor’s classical computational theory of mind. Fodor is one of the brightest proponents of the theory, the one who developed it during almost all his research career.
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The present study explores the possibility of combining the insights of computational and naturalistic approaches to cognition in a coherent way that enables us to move beyond the naturalistic fallacy identified by Sellars.
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