Minds, Machines and Gödel

  title={Minds, Machines and G{\"o}del},
  author={John Randolph Lucas},
  pages={112 - 127}
  • J. Lucas
  • Published 1 April 1961
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophy
Gödei's Theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained as machines. So also has it seemed to many other people: almost every mathematical logician I have put the matter to has confessed to similar thoughts, but has felt reluctant to commit himself definitely until he could see the whole argument set out, with all objections fully stated and properly met. This I attempt to do. 

Mechanism: A Rejoinder

Lewis argues that I have established that there is a certain Lucas arithmetic which is clearly true and cannot be the output of some Turing machine. If I could produce the whole of Lucas arithmetic,

Artificial Intelligence, Gödelian Arguments Against

Godel's incompleteness theorem says that there are arithmetical truths expressible in certain formal systems which cannot be proven within those systems. This result reveals certain inherent

Proving that the Mind Is Not a Machine?

  • J. Stern
  • Philosophy
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
  • 2019
This piece continues the tradition of arguments by John Lucas, Roger Penrose and others to the e ect that the human mind is not a machine. Kurt Gödel thought that the intensional paradoxes stand in

The Mind's I Has Two Eyes

In ‘Minds, Machines and Gödel’, 1961, J. R. Lucas proposed that Godel's theorem made possible a refutation of mechanism—the thesis that mind is wholly comprehensible as a consistent, rule-governed

Use and Misuse of Godel's Theorem

(1) The human mind is incapable of formulating (or mechanizing) all its mathe matical intuitions. I.e.: if it has succeeded in formulating some of them, this very fact yields new intuitive knowledge,

Gödel’s Disjunctive Argument

Gödel argued that the incompleteness theorems entail that the mind is not a machine, or that certain arithmetical propositions are absolutely undecidable. His view was that the mind is not a

Gödel, Lucas, and the Soul-Searching Selfie

J. R. Lucas argues against mechanism that an ideal, immortal agent whose mental activities could be mimicked by a Turing machine would be able, absurdly, to prove the Godel sentence for the set of

Minds versus machines: on Saka's basic blindspot theorem

It is shown that while the Gödelian argument that no cognitive system can be complete and correct, it may fail with respect to minds, so contributing to draw a boundary between the former and the latter.



The Lesbian Rule

The problem with which I wish to deal in this paper is the problem of singular reasons in the humanities, whether they exist, or rather, whether they can exist: for it would seem that the word

Extensions of some theorems of Gödel and Church

  • J. Rosser
  • Mathematics, Philosophy
    Journal of Symbolic Logic
  • 1936
It is proved that simple consistency implies the existence of undecidable propositions and the non-existence of an Entscheidungsverfahren by a strengthening of Godel's Satz VI and Kleene's Theorem XIII.