Mind-making practices: the social infrastructure of self-knowing agency and responsibility

  title={Mind-making practices: the social infrastructure of self-knowing agency and responsibility},
  author={Victoria McGeer},
  journal={Philosophical Explorations},
  pages={259 - 281}
  • V. McGeer
  • Published 2015
  • Sociology
  • Philosophical Explorations
This paper is divided into two parts. In Section 1, I explore and defend a “regulative view” of folk-psychology as against the “standard view” (encompassing both theory-theory and simulation theory, as well as hybrid variations). On the regulative view, folk-psychology is conceptualized in fundamentally interpersonal terms as a “mind-making” practice through which we come to form and regulate our minds in accordance with a rich array of socially shared and socially maintained sense-making norms… Expand
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