Mind-brain interaction: Mentalism, yes; dualism, no

  title={Mind-brain interaction: Mentalism, yes; dualism, no},
  author={Roger Wolcott Sperry},
  • R. Sperry
  • Published 1 February 1980
  • Psychology, Philosophy
  • Neuroscience

The Neural Time — Factor in Perception, Volition and Free Will

It is shown that a causative role for conscious mental processes is readily accommodated within a dualist interactionist theory of mind and brain and also within the framework of a monist determinist theory.

“Scientific roots” of dualism in neuroscience

Brain, Behavior, and Mind: What do we know and What can we Know?

Minding matter: how not to argue for the causal efficacy of the mental

It is argued that linking psychology to quantum physics contradicts many basic tenets of the current neurosciences and is thus not a promising line of study and it is concluded that the interactionist hypothesis benefits from neither conceptual nor empirical support.


The paper begins by contrasting the unitary nature of conscious experience with the demonstrable localization of neural events. Philosophers and neuroscientists have developed models to account for

Relation between neurophysiological and mental states: Possible limits of decodability

  • A. Gierer
  • Philosophy, Psychology
  • 2004
Analysis of limits for an algorithmic theory of the mind-body problem suggested by this study suggests that limits of decodability of the psycho-physic relation may actually exist with respect to brain states with self-referential aspects, as they are involved in mental processes.

A Philosophic Study of Non-conceptualized Auditory Sensations : Mental States as Functionally Interpreted Abstract Dispositions

The aim of the present thesis is to examine the idea that mental states and consciousness in general are nothing above and beyond neural processes in the human brain. To this end, prominent positions

The impact and promise of the cognitive revolution.

Opening a new era in science, psychology's cognitive revolution contradicts traditional doctrine that science has no use for consciousness to explain brain function. Subjective mental states as


  • Ü. Tan
  • Psychology, Biology
    The International journal of neuroscience
  • 2007
The psychom motor theory rejects the mind-brain duality and instead advances the unity of the psychomotor system, which will have important consequences in understanding and improving the human mind, brain, and body in health and disease.

Emergence and the Mind-Body Problem in Roger Sperry’s Studies

Abstract Roger Sperry’s scientific career from his beginnings at Oberlin College in 1934 to his Nobel Prize in 1981 and his death in 1994 is examined from the point of view of the interaction between



A unifying approach to mind and brain: ten year perspective.

  • R. Sperry
  • Psychology, Biology
    Progress in brain research
  • 1976

Mental Phenomena as Causal Determinants in Brain Function

The central concepts concerning consciousness that I shall try to defend have already been presented in some detail (Sperry, 1952, 1964, 1965). Accordingly, I shall review them only in brief outline,

A modified concept of consciousness.

  • R. Sperry
  • Psychology, Biology
    Psychological review
  • 1969
A theory of mind is suggested in which consciousness, interpreted to be a direct emergent property of cerebral activity, is conceived to be an integral component of the brain process that functions as an essential constituent of the action and exerts a directive holistic form of control over the flow pattern of cerebral excitation.

Emergence and the mind

On the Nature of Consciousness and of Physical Reality

  • D. L. Wilson
  • Philosophy
    Perspectives in biology and medicine
  • 1976
In this' paper, "mind" or "inner self will refer to some of the states and processes which arise from or contribute to internal brain structure, which include willing, consciousness, thought, and perception.

Cognition as Events and as Psychic Constructions

Because the current resurgence of the mentalistic interpretation of cognitive events runs counter to scientific norms, it prompts a thorough analysis of the source and nature of Cognitivism. As to

Consciousness and brain. I. The identity thesis.

  • G. Globus
  • Psychology
    Archives of general psychiatry
  • 1973
It is argued that objections to Feigl's psychoneural identity thesis can be countered by considering consciousness as identical with "pure events" which, to an observer, are neurally embodied.

The "mental" and the "physical"

Taking into consideration everything we have said so far about the scientific and the philosophical aspects of the mind-body problem, the following view suggests itself: The raw feels of direct

What the Mind’s Eye Tells the Mind’s Brain: A Critique of Mental Imagery

This paper presents a critique of contemporary research which uses the notion of a mental image as a theoretical construct to describe one form of memory representation. It is argued that an adequate

The Importance of Brain Research for the Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Future of Mankind

  • J. Eccles
  • Art
    Perspectives in biology and medicine
  • 1968
My philosophical position is diametrically opposite to those who would relegate conscious experience to the meaningless role of an epiphenomenon, and it is my belief that the authors will be successful only insofar as they appreciate the nature of man and plan accordingly.