Mind and Illusion

@article{Jackson2003MindAI,
  title={Mind and Illusion},
  author={Frank Cameron Jackson},
  journal={Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement},
  year={2003},
  volume={53},
  pages={251 - 271}
}
  • F. Jackson
  • Published 1 September 2003
  • Philosophy, Art
  • Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
Much of the contemporary debate in the philosophy of mind is concerned with the clash between certain strongly held intuitions and what science tells us about the mind and its relation to the world. What science tells us about the mind points strongly towards some version or other of physicalism. The intuitions, in one way or another, suggest that there is something seriously incomplete about any purely physical story about the mind. 

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