Migration and the evolution of conventions

@inproceedings{Bhaskara2001MigrationAT,
  title={Migration and the evolution of conventions},
  author={Venugopal Bhaskara and Fernando Vega-Redondoa},
  year={2001}
}
We study an evolutionary model where agents are locally matched to play a symmetric coordination game. Opportunities to adjust strategy and location arrive asynchronously and infrequently, and cannot be coordinated. Our results on the short-run co-existence of different conventions and long-run efficiency depend upon a condition on off-equilibrium payoffs introduced by Aumann. In a pure coordination game , efficient and inefficient conventions may co-exist at different locations in the short… CONTINUE READING
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