Corpus ID: 16921130

Michael Dummett on Social Choice and Voting

@inproceedings{Salles2007MichaelDO,
  title={Michael Dummett on Social Choice and Voting},
  author={Maurice Salles},
  year={2007}
}
Michael Dummett worked on the theoretical aspects of aggregation of individual preferences and on the strategic aspects of voting theory. He also extended Black’s analysis of single-peaked preferences for majority rule to the case of voting games (majority games), offering a greater flexibility for the expression of voters’ preferences. He is also with Donald Saari one of the major advocates of the use of Borda’s rule in actual voting. In two books and a paper, he proposed many examples showing… Expand
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An Interview with Michael Dummett: from Analytical Philosophy to Voting Analysis and Beyond
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One of the greatest contemporary philosophers whose work on the German logician Frege, on intuitionism, realism, anti-realism, justificationism has been central for the development of analytical philosophy in the second part of the last century and in this century is outlined. Expand
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The first phase in the history of modern social choice theory comprised two fundamental pieces of work: first, the articles on the theory of voting by Duncan Black, published in 1948 and 1949, andExpand
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