Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: the truth about false belief.

  title={Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: the truth about false belief.},
  author={Henry M. Wellman and David R. Cross and Julanne Watson},
  journal={Child development},
  volume={72 3},
Research on theory of mind increasingly encompasses apparently contradictory findings. In particular, in initial studies, older preschoolers consistently passed false-belief tasks-a so-called "definitive" test of mental-state understanding-whereas younger children systematically erred. More recent studies, however, have found evidence of false-belief understanding in 3-year-olds or have demonstrated conditions that improve children's performance. A meta-analysis was conducted (N = 178 separate… 

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