Corpus ID: 5752727

Message Authentication with MD 5 *

@inproceedings{Kaliski1995MessageAW,
  title={Message Authentication with MD 5 *},
  author={Burton S. Kaliski and Matthew J. B. Robshaw},
  year={1995}
}
But how to do it? Hash functions are intended to resist inversion —finding a message with a given hash value — and collision — finding two messages with the same hash value. Message authentication codes, on the other hand, are intended to resist forgery — computing a message authentication code without knowledge of a secret key. Building a message authentication code on an encryption function thus seems a logical choice (and the security relationship has been recently settled — in work by Mihir… Expand

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