• Corpus ID: 15774460

Mergers with Differentiated Products

@inproceedings{Shapiro1996MergersWD,
  title={Mergers with Differentiated Products},
  author={Carl Shapiro},
  year={1996}
}
T he antitrust treatment of horizontal mergers by the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission is one of the most well developed and closely scrutinized areas of antitrust law. The enforcement agencies have extraordinary experience reviewing mergers and the merger bar is no less sophisticated. From my perspective as an antitrust economist, this sophistication permits merger enforcement to be at the cutting edge when it comes to incorporating economic learning into competition policy… 
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