Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence

@article{Bernheim1986MenuAR,
  title={Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence},
  author={B. Bernheim and M. Whinston},
  journal={Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  year={1986},
  volume={101},
  pages={1-31}
}
In many examples of competitive bidding (e.g., government construction contracting) the relevant object is either partially divisible or ill-defined, in contrast to much of the recent theoretical work on auctions. In this paper we consider a more general class of auctions, in which bidders name a "menu" of offers for various possible actions (allocations) available to the auctioneer. We focus upon "first-price" menu auctions under the assumption of complete information, and show that, for an… Expand
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