Mental models and probabilistic thinking

@article{JohnsonLaird1994MentalMA,
  title={Mental models and probabilistic thinking},
  author={Philip N. Johnson-Laird},
  journal={Cognition},
  year={1994},
  volume={50},
  pages={189-209}
}
This paper outlines the theory of reasoning based on mental models, and then shows how this theory might be extended to deal with probabilistic thinking. The same explanatory framework accommodates deduction and induction: there are both deductive and inductive inferences that yield probabilistic conclusions. The framework yields a theoretical conception of strength of inference, that is, a theory of what the strength of an inference is objectively: it equals the proportion of possible states… 
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