Mental Models in Deductive Reasoning

  title={Mental Models in Deductive Reasoning},
  author={Juan Antonio Garc{\'i}a-Madruga and F Guti{\'e}rrez and Nuria Carriedo and Sergio Moreno and Philip N. Johnson-Laird},
  journal={The Spanish Journal of Psychology},
  pages={125 - 140}
We report research investigating the role of mental models in deduction. The first study deals with conjunctive inferences (from one conjunction and two conditional premises) and disjunctive inferences (from one disjunction and the same two conditionals). The second study examines reasoning from multiple conditionals such as: If e then b; If a then b; If b then c; What follows between a and c? The third study addresses reasoning from different sorts of conditional assertions, including… 

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