Meditation and the scope of mental action

@article{Upton2019MeditationAT,
  title={Meditation and the scope of mental action},
  author={Candace L. Upton and Michael Brent},
  journal={Philosophical Psychology},
  year={2019},
  volume={32},
  pages={52 - 71}
}
ABSTRACT While philosophers of mind have devoted abundant time and attention to questions of content and consciousness, philosophical questions about the nature and scope of mental action have been relatively neglected. Galen Strawson’s account of mental action, the most well developed extant account, holds that cognitive mental action consists in triggering the delivery of content to one’s field of consciousness. However, Strawson fails to recognize several distinct types of mental action that… Expand
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