Medical insurance and the use of health care services by the elderly.

  title={Medical insurance and the use of health care services by the elderly.},
  author={Michael D. Hurd and Kathleen McGarry},
  journal={Journal of health economics},
  volume={16 2},
  • M. Hurd, K. McGarry
  • Published 1 April 1997
  • Medicine, Political Science
  • Journal of health economics

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