Mediators in position auctions

@inproceedings{Ashlagi2007MediatorsIP,
  title={Mediators in position auctions},
  author={Itai Ashlagi and Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz},
  booktitle={EC '07},
  year={2007}
}
A mediator is a reliable entity, which can play on behalf of agents in a given game. A mediator however can not enforce the use of its services, and each agent is free to participate in the game directly. In this paper we introduce a study of mediators for games with incomplete information, and apply it to the context of position auctions, a central topic in electronic commerce. VCG position auctions, which are currently not used in practice, possess somenice theoretical properties, such as the… 
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