Media Mergers and Media Bias with Rational Consumers

@article{Anderson2007MediaMA,
  title={Media Mergers and Media Bias with Rational Consumers},
  author={Simon P. Anderson and John McLaren},
  journal={Microeconomics: Asymmetric \& Private Information eJournal},
  year={2007}
}
We present an economic model of media bias and media mergers. Media owners have political motives as well as profit motives, and can influence public opinion by withholding information that is pejorative to their political agenda — provided that their agenda is not too far out of the political mainstream. This is true even with rational consumers who understand the media owners’ biases, because the public do not know how much information the news organizations have and so do not know when news… Expand
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