# Mechanism design with uncertain inputs: (to err is human, to forgive divine)

@inproceedings{Feige2011MechanismDW, title={Mechanism design with uncertain inputs: (to err is human, to forgive divine)}, author={Uriel Feige and Moshe Tennenholtz}, booktitle={STOC '11}, year={2011} }

We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem, there is a truthful mechanism that achieves maximum welfare in dominant strategies. The new aspect of our work is that in our setting players are uncertain about their own job lengths, and hence are incapable of providing truthful reports (in the strict sense of…

## 21 Citations

Truthful Generalized Assignments via Stable Matching

- Computer ScienceMath. Oper. Res.
- 2014

An affirmative answer to this question is given and a constant approximation mechanism is provided to provide a logarithmic approximation truthful in expectation mechanism in the generalized assignment problem (gap).

Mechanism design with approximate types

- Economics
- 2012

For general games beyond auctions, the classical problem of maximizing social welfare in auctions when players know their true valuations only within a constant multiplicative factor is studied, and a universality result is provided showing that all reasonable models of type uncertainty are equivalent to the set-theoretic one.

Knightian Auctions

- Computer ScienceArXiv
- 2011

This work proves that no dominant-strategy mechanism can guarantee social welfare that is significantly better than that achievable by assigning the good to a random player, and provides tight upper and lower bounds for the fraction of the maximum social welfare achievable in undominated strategies.

Mechanisms for Fair Allocation Problems: No-Punishment Payment Rules in Verifiable Settings

- EconomicsJ. Artif. Intell. Res.
- 2014

It turns out that it is #P-complete so that, to deal with applications with many agents involved, two polynomial-time randomized variants are also proposed: one that is still truthful and efficient, and which is approximately budget-balanced with high probability, and another that is truthful in expectation, while still budget- balanced and efficient.

Mechanism design with approximate valuations

- EconomicsITCS '12
- 2012

It is proved that no dominant-strategy mechanism can guarantee social welfare that is significantly better than that achievable by assigning the good to a random player, and tight upper and lower bounds are provided for the fraction of the maximum social welfare achievable in undominated strategies.

Efficient Task Collaboration with Execution Uncertainty

- EconomicsArXiv
- 2015

This work considers a more complex setting where an agent's execution uncertainty is not completely predictable by the agent alone but aggregated from all agents' private opinions (known as trust), and shows that PEV-based mechanism with trust is still truthfully implementable if and only if the trust aggregation is multilinear.

Mechanism Design for Locating a Facility under Partial Information

- Economics, Computer ScienceSAGT
- 2019

The classic mechanism design problem of locating a public facility on a real line is studied, and robust deterministic mechanisms are explored, which can be viewed as extensions to the classical optimal mechanisms in that they perform optimally when agents precisely know and specify their preferred locations.

Near-optimal scheduling mechanisms for deadline-sensitive jobs in large computing clusters

- Computer ScienceSPAA '12
- 2012

A general framework for transforming allocation algorithms into truthful mechanisms in domains of single-value and multi-properties is provided and the basic mechanism can be extended under proper Bayesian assumptions to the objective of maximizing revenues, which is important for public clouds.

Hotelling Games with Multiple Line Faults

- EconomicsArXiv
- 2019

A fault-prone version of the Hotelling game, where the line fails at multiple random locations, is studied, showing that the game admits a Nash equilibrium if and only if the rate of faults exceeds a certain threshold, and calculating that threshold approximately.

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