Mechanism design in large games: incentives and privacy

  title={Mechanism design in large games: incentives and privacy},
  author={M. Kearns and M. Pai and A. Roth and J. Ullman},
  • M. Kearns, M. Pai, +1 author J. Ullman
  • Published 2014
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
  • ArXiv
  • We study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings of incomplete information, and address this problem using "recommender mechanisms." A recommender mechanism is one that does not have the power to enforce outcomes or to force participation, rather it only has the power to suggestion outcomes on the basis of voluntary participation. We show that despite these restrictions, recommender mechanisms can implement equilibria of complete information games in… CONTINUE READING
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