Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy

@article{McSherry2007MechanismDV,
  title={Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy},
  author={Frank McSherry and Kunal Talwar},
  journal={48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'07)},
  year={2007},
  pages={94-103}
}
  • F. McSherry, Kunal Talwar
  • Published 2007
  • Computer Science
  • 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS'07)
We study the role that privacy-preserving algorithms, which prevent the leakage of specific information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic agents, which must encourage players to honestly report information. Specifically, we show that the recent notion of differential privacv, in addition to its own intrinsic virtue, can ensure that participants have limited effect on the outcome of the mechanism, and as a consequence have limited incentive to lie. More… Expand
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