Mechanism Design for Two-Opposite-Facility Location Games with Penalties on Distance

@inproceedings{Chen2018MechanismDF,
  title={Mechanism Design for Two-Opposite-Facility Location Games with Penalties on Distance},
  author={Xujin Chen and Xiaodong Hu and Xiaohua Jia and Minming Li and Zhongzheng Tang and Chenhao Wang},
  booktitle={SAGT},
  year={2018}
}
This paper is devoted to the two-opposite-facility location games with a penalty whose amount depends on the distance between the two facilities to be opened by an authority. The two facilities are “opposite” in that one is popular and the other is obnoxious. Every selfish agent in the game wishes to stay close to the popular facility and stay away from the obnoxious one; its utility is measured by the difference between its distances to the obnoxious facility and the popular one. The authority… 
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