Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal : The Quasi-Linear Private-Values Case

@inproceedings{Mylovanov2012MechanismDB,
  title={Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal : The Quasi-Linear Private-Values Case},
  author={Tymofiy Mylovanov and Thomas Tr{\"o}ger},
  year={2012}
}
We show that, in environments with independent private values and transferable utility, a privately informed principal can solve her mechanism selection problem by implementing an allocation that is ex-ante optimal for her. No type of the principal can gain from proposing an alternative mechanism that is incentivefeasible with any belief that puts probability 0 on types that would strictly lose from proposing the alternative. We show that the solution exists in essentially any environment with… CONTINUE READING
Highly Influential
This paper has highly influenced 15 other papers. REVIEW HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL CITATIONS
Highly Cited
This paper has 91 citations. REVIEW CITATIONS

Citations

Publications citing this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 67 extracted citations

91 Citations

051015'11'13'15'17'19
Citations per Year
Semantic Scholar estimates that this publication has 91 citations based on the available data.

See our FAQ for additional information.

References

Publications referenced by this paper.
Showing 1-10 of 31 references

Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade

View 6 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Countervailing incentives in agency problems,

T. R. Lewis, D.E.M. Sappington
Journal of Economic Theory, • 1989
View 4 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently

Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, PAUL KLEMPERERI
1987
View 4 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Mechanism design by an informed principal,

R. B. Myerson
Auction Design,” Mathematics of Operations Research, • 1983
View 9 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Optimization by Vector Space Methods

D. G. Luenberger
1969
View 5 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Scoring Auction by an Informed Principal,

T. Nishimura
2012
View 4 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Optimal auction with resale,

C Z.
Journal of Economic Theory, • 2002
View 3 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Efficient performance in two-agent bargaining,

S. R. Williams
Journal of economic • 1987
View 4 Excerpts
Highly Influenced

Similar Papers

Loading similar papers…