Mechanism Design Under Approximate Incentive Compatibility

@article{Balseiro2021MechanismDU,
  title={Mechanism Design Under Approximate Incentive Compatibility},
  author={Santiago R. Balseiro and Omar Besbes and Francisco Castro},
  journal={Operations Research},
  year={2021}
}
An assumption that is pervasive in revenue management and economics is that buyers are perfect optimizers. However, in practice, buyers may be limited by their computational capabilities or lack of information and may not be able to perfectly optimize their response to a selling mechanism. This has motivated the introduction of approximate incentive compatibility as a solution concept for practical mechanisms. In “Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility,” Balseiro, Besbes… 
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