Mechanism Design Experiments

  title={Mechanism Design Experiments},
  author={Yan Chen and John O. Ledyard},
Mechanism design experiments bridge the gap between a theoretical mechanism and an actual economic process. In the domain of public goods, matching and combinatorial auctions, laboratory experiments identify features of mechanisms which lead to good performance when implemented among boundedly rational agents. These features include dynamic stability and security in public goods mechanisms, transparency in matching mechanisms, package bidding, simultaneity and iteration in combinatorial… CONTINUE READING

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