Corpus ID: 53060407

Measuring the Rapid Growth of HSTS and HPKP Deployments

@inproceedings{Petrov2017MeasuringTR,
  title={Measuring the Rapid Growth of HSTS and HPKP Deployments},
  author={Ivan Petrov and D Iu Peskov and Gregory Coard and Taejoong Chung and David R. Choffnes and Dave Levin and Bruce M. Maggs and Alan Mislove and Christo Wilson},
  year={2017}
}
A basic man-in-the-middle attack to bypass HTTPS strips the “s” off of an “https://” URL, thereby forcing the client to effectively downgrade to an insecure connection. To address such crude attacks, the HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security) protocol was recently introduced, which instructs clients to preemptively (or at time of first acquire) load a list of domains to whom to connect strictly via HTTPS. In a similar vein, the HPKP (HTTP Public Key Pinning) protocol has clients obtain a set of… Expand

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