Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules

@article{Kondratev2019MeasuringMP,
  title={Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules},
  author={Aleksei Y. Kondratev and Alexander S. Nesterov},
  journal={Public Choice},
  year={2019},
  volume={183},
  pages={187-210}
}
We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority from dominating minorities: whether a voting rule makes a majority powerful and whether minorities can veto the candidates they do not prefer. For a given voting rule, the minimal share of voters that guarantees a victory to one of the majority’s most preferred candidates is the measure of majority power; and the minimal share of voters that allows the minority to veto each of their least preferred candidates is the… 
Computing the proportional veto core
TLDR
A polynomial time algorithm for computing the veto core is presented and a neutral and anonymous algorithm for selecting a candidate from it is presented, and it is shown that a pessimist can manipulate the vetoed core in polynometric time.
Computing the proportional veto core
TLDR
A polynomial time algorithm for computing the proportional veto core is presented and an anonymous algorithm for selecting a candidate from it is presented, and it is shown that a pessimist can manipulate the core in polynometric time.
How should we score athletes and candidates: geometric scoring rules
TLDR
This work study whether scoring rules can be robust to adding or deleting particular candidates, as occurs with spoilers in political elections and with athletes in sports due to doping allegations, and pin down a one-parameter family of geometric scoring rules.
The Schulze Method of Voting
TLDR
A new single-winner election method ("Schulze method") is proposed and it is proved that it satisfies many academic criteria and a generalization of the Condorcet criterion to multi-winner elections is proposed.

References

SHOWING 1-10 OF 106 REFERENCES
The Costs of Implementing the Majority Principle: The Golden Voting Rule
In a context of constitutional choice of a voting rule, this paper presents an economic analysis of scoring rules that identifies the golden voting rule under the impartial culture assumption. This
Ameliorating Majority Decisiveness through Expression of Preference Intensity
In pairwise voting, when a simple majority rule produces a winner, that winner is robust to the minority's preferences. The typical means of protecting the minority from the decisiveness of the
Paradoxes of Voting
Five voting paradoxes are examined under procedures which determine social choice from voters' preference rankings. The most extreme forms of each paradox are identified, and their potential
Positional Voting Methods Satisfying the Criteria of Weak Mutual Majority and Condorcet Loser
TLDR
This paper considers a voting problem in which the individual preferences of electors are defined by the ranked lists of candidates and forms the criterion of weak positional dominance (WPD, PD), which is closely related to the positional scoring rules.
How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?
We estimate the frequencies with which ten voting anomalies (ties and nine voting paradoxes) occur under 14 voting rules, using a statistical model that simulates voting situations that follow the
A Note on the Likelihood of the Absolute Majority Paradoxes
For three-candidate elections, we compute under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption, the conditional probabilities of the Absolute Majority Winner Paradox (AMWP) and the Absolute Majority
Which voting rule is most likely to choose the “best” candidate?
One criterion for evaluating voting rules is the frequency with which they select the best candidate. Using a spatial model of voting that is capable of simulating data with the same statistical
Which Voting Rule is Most Likely to Choose the 'Best' Candidate?
One criterion for evaluating voting rules is the frequency with which they select the best candidate. Using a spatial model of voting that is capable of simulating data with the same statistical
Statistical evaluation of voting rules
TLDR
This work generates synthetic elections using two sources of survey data, two spatial models, and two standard models from the voting literature to test whether each of 54 voting rules is non-manipulable, and efficient in the sense of maximizing summed utilities.
...
...