Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules

  title={Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules},
  author={Aleksei Y. Kondratev and Alexander S. Nesterov},
  journal={Public Choice},
  • Aleksei Y. Kondratev, Alexander S. Nesterov
  • Published 2018
  • Mathematics, Economics, Computer Science
  • Public Choice
  • We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority from dominating minorities: whether a voting rule makes a majority powerful and whether minorities can veto the candidates they do not prefer. For a given voting rule, the minimal share of voters that guarantees a victory to one of the majority’s most preferred candidates is the measure of majority power; and the minimal share of voters that allows the minority to veto each of their least preferred candidates is the… CONTINUE READING

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