# Measuring Violations of Positive Involvement in Voting

@inproceedings{Holliday2021MeasuringVO, title={Measuring Violations of Positive Involvement in Voting}, author={W. Holliday and E. Pacuit}, booktitle={TARK}, year={2021} }

In the context of computational social choice, we study voting methods that assign a set of winners to each profile of voter preferences. A voting method satisfies the property of positive involvement (PI) if for any election in which a candidate x would be among the winners, adding another voter to the election who ranks x first does not cause x to lose. Surprisingly, a number of standard voting methods violate this natural property. In this paper, we investigate different ways of measuring…

## One Citation

Axioms for defeat in democratic elections

- EconomicsJournal of Theoretical Politics
- 2021

It is proved that the five axioms plus Coherent IIA single out a method of determining defeats studied in the recent work: Split Cycle, which provides the most resolute definition of defeat among any satisfying the six axiomatic for democratic defeat.

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