Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games

  title={Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games},
  author={Frank Heinemann and Rosemarie Nagel and Peter Ockenfels},
Coordination games with strategic complementarities typically have multiple equilibria. Multiplicity of equilibria is associated with strategic uncertainty to which we cannot assign probabilities by pure deductive reasoning. Strategic uncertainty has often been described as a situation of Knightian uncertainty as opposed to risky situations that are characterized by given probabilities. In this paper we present an experiment designed to measure individual attitudes towards strategic uncertainty… CONTINUE READING
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