Measuring Majority Tyranny: Axiomatic Approach
@article{Kondratev2018MeasuringMT, title={Measuring Majority Tyranny: Axiomatic Approach}, author={Aleksei Y. Kondratev and Alexander S. Nesterov}, journal={Social & Political Philosophy eJournal}, year={2018} }
We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority to dominate minorities. For this purpose we propose a novel quantitative criterion for voting rules: the quali ed mutual majority criterion (q; k)-MM. For a xed total number of m candidates, a voting rule satis es (q; k)-MM if whenever some k candidates receive top k ranks in an arbitrary order from a majority that consists of more than q 2 (0; 1) of voters, the voting rule selects one of these k candidates. The standard… CONTINUE READING
References
SHOWING 1-10 OF 50 REFERENCES
Ameliorating Majority Decisiveness through Expression of Preference Intensity
- Economics
- American Political Science Review
- 2002
- 44
- PDF
Exact analysis of Dodgson elections: Lewis Carroll's 1876 voting system is complete for parallel access to NP
- Mathematics, Computer Science
- JACM
- 1997
- 195
- PDF