Measuring Majority Tyranny: Axiomatic Approach

@article{Kondratev2018MeasuringMT,
  title={Measuring Majority Tyranny: Axiomatic Approach},
  author={Aleksei Y. Kondratev and Alexander S. Nesterov},
  journal={Social & Political Philosophy eJournal},
  year={2018}
}
  • Aleksei Y. Kondratev, Alexander S. Nesterov
  • Published 2018
  • Mathematics
  • Social & Political Philosophy eJournal
  • We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority to dominate minorities. For this purpose we propose a novel quantitative criterion for voting rules: the quali ed mutual majority criterion (q; k)-MM. For a xed total number of m candidates, a voting rule satis es (q; k)-MM if whenever some k candidates receive top k ranks in an arbitrary order from a majority that consists of more than q 2 (0; 1) of voters, the voting rule selects one of these k candidates. The standard… CONTINUE READING

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