Meaningless Happiness and Meaningful Suffering

@article{Jollimore2004MeaninglessHA,
  title={Meaningless Happiness and Meaningful Suffering},
  author={T. Jollimore},
  journal={Southern Journal of Philosophy},
  year={2004},
  volume={42},
  pages={333-347}
}
  • T. Jollimore
  • Published 2004
  • Psychology
  • Southern Journal of Philosophy
The theory I will refer to as the eudaimonistic theory of value consists of three claims: (1) that all happiness is intrinsically valuable, (2) that all suffering is intrinsically disvaluable (i.e., possesses negative value), and (3) that nothing else is either intrinsically valuable or intrinsically disvaluable. By ‘happiness’ and ‘suffering’ I mean to refer to certain kinds of subjective states. (Some people, by contrast, mean by ‘happiness’ something like overall human flourishing.) Thus… Expand
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iF GRIEF is NOT BAD then is it good?" asks Thomas Wise. As his examples show, he does not limit inquiry to nonmoral categories as I did in considering two incompatible but prominent views in theExpand
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