Mean-field interactions in evolutionary spatial games

  title={Mean-field interactions in evolutionary spatial games},
  author={Dmitri Antonov and Evgeni Burovski and Lev N. Shchur},
  journal={Physical Review Research},
We introduce a mean-field term to an evolutionary spatial game model. Namely, we consider the game of Nowak and May, based on the Prisoner’s dilemma, and augment the game rules by a self-consistent mean-field term. This way, an agent operates based on local information from its neighbors and non-local information via the mean-field coupling. We simulate the model and construct the steady-state phase diagram, which shows significant new features due to the mean-field term. The main effects are… Expand

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