McTaggart's Paradox and Temporal Solipsism

  title={McTaggart's Paradox and Temporal Solipsism},
  author={William Lane Craig},
  journal={Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
  pages={32 - 44}
  • W. Craig
  • Published 1 March 2001
  • Philosophy
  • Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Undoubtedly the most celebrated argument against an A-Theory of time is the attempt by the British idealist J.M.E. McTaggart to demonstrate that a temporally ordered series of events, each possessing various tense determinations, is self-contradictory or leads to a vicious infinite regress of tense determinations. Although McTaggart himself regarded his demonstration as a proof that time does not exist, certain contemporary B-theorists employ versions of his argument to prove the unreality of… 

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Lewis' Indexical Argument for World-Relative Actuality

David Lewis has shocked the philosophical community with his original version of extreme modal realism according to which “every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world is”.

On Time and Actuality: The Dilemma of Privileged Position

  • Palle Yourgrau
  • Philosophy
    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 1986
It has seemed obvious to many that while the present reflects nothing objective in the nature of things, the actual world is the very stuff reality is made of. With the notable exception of David

For further discussion see John Bigelow

  • The Nature of Necessity, Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy
  • 1974

the similar exposition of the views of Prior in contrast to those of Quine by Jeremy Butterfield

  • Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

The account given here is based on Nicholas Wolterstorff

  • Grazer Philosophische Studien
  • 1979