Maxmin Expected Utility with Non-Unique Prior

@article{Gilboa1989MaxminEU,
  title={Maxmin Expected Utility with Non-Unique Prior},
  author={Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler},
  journal={Journal of Mathematical Economics},
  year={1989},
  volume={18},
  pages={141-153}
}
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Foundations of neo-Bayesian statistics
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