Maximizing Revenue in Sequential Auctions

@inproceedings{Elkind2007MaximizingRI,
  title={Maximizing Revenue in Sequential Auctions},
  author={Edith Elkind and S. Shaheen Fatima},
  booktitle={WINE},
  year={2007}
}
We study sequential auctions for private value objects and unit-demand bidders using second-price sealed-bid rules. We analyze this scenario from the seller’s perspective and consider several approaches to increasing the total revenue. We derive the equilibrium bidding strategies for each individual auction. We then study the problem of selecting an optimal agenda, i.e., a revenue-maximizing ordering of the auctions. We describe an efficient algorithm that finds an optimal agenda in the… CONTINUE READING

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