Mathematics and democracy: Designing better voting and fair-division procedures

@article{Brams2008MathematicsAD,
  title={Mathematics and democracy: Designing better voting and fair-division procedures},
  author={Steven J. Brams},
  journal={Math. Comput. Model.},
  year={2008},
  volume={48},
  pages={1666-1670}
}
  • S. Brams
  • Published 1 November 2008
  • Economics
  • Math. Comput. Model.

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