Matching with Couples : Stability and Incentives in Large Markets *

@inproceedings{Kojima2010MatchingWC,
  title={Matching with Couples : Stability and Incentives in Large Markets *},
  author={Fuhito Kojima and Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth},
  year={2010}
}
Accommodating couples has been a longstanding issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are present. We find conditions under which a stable matching exists with high probability in large markets. We present a mechanism that finds a stable matching with high probability, and which makes truth-telling by all participants an approximate equilibrium… CONTINUE READING
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