Matching mechanisms and matching quality: Evidence from a top university in China

@article{Wu2014MatchingMA,
  title={Matching mechanisms and matching quality: Evidence from a top university in China},
  author={Binzhen Wu and Xiaohan Zhong},
  journal={Games Econ. Behav.},
  year={2014},
  volume={84},
  pages={196-215}
}
We compare competing college admission matching mechanisms that differ in preference submission timing (pre-exam, post-exam but pre-score, or post-score) and in matching procedure (Boston (BOS) and serial dictatorship (SD) matching). Pre-exam submission asks students to submit college preferences before entrance exam scores are known, whereas post-score (post-exam) submission removes (reduces) score uncertainties. Theoretical analyses show that although mechanisms with post-score submission or… Expand
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